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Judicial use of legislative history to interpret statutes is under renewed
attack.' First, critics contend that the "law" consists of the statute's text
as voted on by the legislature and signed by the President. Legislative
history, they assert, is a rival text created by a group other than the
legislature that should not be used to determine statutory meaning. Second,
critics argue that the political process by which legislative history is created
is fundamentally flawed.
This first broad "formalist" argument is unlikely to have much impact
in the United States. The courts are too committed to reconstructing
legislative intent, or at least worrying about what that intent mght be, to
abandon exanumng legislative history Moreover, courts can resolve the
textualist's "horror"-an unambiguous text conflicting with legislative his-
tory-in favor of the statutory language without adopting the more general
position that legislative history is never relevant m interpreting ambiguous
text. In any event, the constitutional primacy of the text is doubtful, given
the well-known exception that plain meaning will not be implemented if it
will produce an "absurd" result.2
The second argument-that the political process is fundamentally flawed-
raises several legitimate concerns. Unelected congressional staff play a major
role in drafting legislative history. Legislative history often poses a serious
risk of political manipulation because its authors might manipulate its
content to undernune the statutory structure or to achieve political results
not attainable directly through the text.
These legitimate criticisms, however, do not support an across-the-board
rejection of legislative history. Congressional staff are often very knowl-
edgeable and are able to flesh out the underlying statutory structure in
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington.
1. See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTmENT OF JUSTICE REPORT TO THE ATToRNEY
GENERAL, UsING AND Misusmia LEGISLATIvE HISTORY: ,A RE-EvALUATION OF THE STATUS OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY iN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989); Eskridge, The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (discussing Justice Scalia).
2. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J., concumng).
This is an exception to the general rule that the plain meaning of an unambiguous text will
be implemented.
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legislative history without being politically manipulative.3 Legislators' use
of legislative history may even protect the political process from special
interest amendments by allowing political agreements to be recorded in
legislative history without unravelling the compromises embodied in a pre-
viously agreed upon statutory text.
Notwithstanding whether judicial use of such legislative history from
legislative sources can be justified, judicial reliance on presidential legislative
history-the material found in presidential statements accompanying the
signing of legislation-poses additional problems. This Article examines
judicial reliance on presidential legislative history and concludes that judicial
reliance on presidential signing statements has almost nothing to recommend
it. Part I reviews the history of presidential use of signing statements to
create legislative history and focuses on President Reagan's dramatic expan-
sion of this practice. 4 Part II provides a critique of presidential legislative
history, arguing that the President is not a legislator and that signing
statements containing specific statements about statutory meaning are often
politically manipulative attempts to undermine statutory structure or achieve
results too controversial to be adopted in the text.
I. PRESIDENTIAL USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The vast majority of presidential signing statements contain general com-
ments about the statute's good and bad features, rather than specific
3. This is often true in tax law. See Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick, Reexamining the
Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process,
67 TAXEs 804, 810-12 (1989).
4. There are difficult research hurdles that prevented a complete survey of presidential
legislative history. Easy access to presidential signing statements is a recent phenomenon,
beginning with government publication of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
in 1965. Before then, presidential signing statements were published in three places: (1) the
Public Papers of the Presidents; see, e.g., Public Papers and Addresses of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt 1944-1945 (1950), cited in Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205, 223-24 (1979); (2) miscellaneous compilations of legislative history; see, e.g., Attorney
General's Memo on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act II,
at IV (1967) (referring to statement by President Johnson), cited in Berry v. Department of
Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1984)); and (3) the "Presidential Messages" section
of the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News (USCCAN). The predecessor
of USCCAN, the United States Congressional Service, also published signing statements in the
"Presidential Messages" section.
In 1965, the government began publishing the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments, including signing statements. Beginning with the March 3, 1986 issue of the Weekly
Compilation, the privately published USCCAN has included presidential signing statements in
its "Legislative History" section. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-251, 22
WEEKLY Comp PaRs..Doc. 291 (Feb. 27, 1986), appearing in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADwN.
NEws 6-2 ("Legislative History").
The following description of presidential practice through the end of the Reagan adminis-
tration is based on an examination of the entire Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
series, secondary sources discussing presidential action and a Lexis and Westlaw search of
cases referring to signing statements.
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interpretations.5 Occasionally, these general comments are cited in judicial
opinions as evidence of statutory context. 6 Signing statements also contain
observations about a statute's constitutionality. An Appendix to this Article
cites more than one hundred such observations, which appear in the Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents. Most of these observations concern
power clashes between the President and Congress over traditional battle-
grounds, such as the legislative veto, appointments power, foreign relations
and execution of the laws. When the President offers an interpretation of
a statute, the interpretation often attempts to address an alleged constitu-
tional defect, such as construing a legislative veto as a "report-and-wait"
provision7 or explaining that an appointee with federal administrative re-
sponsibility, who is not appointed by the President, performs only advisory
functions. 8
5. A few sigming statements called attention to drafting errors. See, e.g., Statement
Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-687, 24 WEEKLY Com'. Pa.s. Doc. 1548 (Nov.
18, 1988); Statement accompanying signing of Pub. L. No. 99-363, 22 WEEKLY CoaP. PREs.
Doc. 934 (July 11, 1986); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 94-29, 11 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 599 (June 5, 1975); see also Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L.
No. 99-472, 22 WEEKLY Comp. PRs. Doc. 1397 (Oct. 15, 1986) (a statute erroneously referred
to Tibet as a country); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 98-181, 19 WEEKLY
Con PREs. Doc. 1627 (Nov. 30, 1983) (a statute erroneously characterized the status of
Taiwan).
6. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1979)
(explaining the purposes of an exemption from the antitrust law); Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1973) (the purpose of a federal statute was to preempt local
control of air traffic noise); Berry v. Department of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (9th Cir.
1984) (the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act); Cordova & Simonpietn Ins. Agency,
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1981) (the purpose of the
Puerto Rican Constitution); Verlinden B.V v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 323
n.9 (2d Cir. 1981) (the President's statement that the statute covered American citizens was
cited to support the view that the statute covered only American citizens; the court rejected
the presidential legislative history, favoring congressional legislative history pointing in the
opposite direction); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970) (the
purpose of a statute dealing with sex discrimnation); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420
F.2d 648, 657 n.20 (5th Cir. 1969) (the purpose of a statute dealing with sex discrimination);
Grumbine v. United.States, 586 F Supp. 1144, 1146 n.4 (D.D.C. 1984) (the purpose of a
statute dealing with sex discrimination); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 410 F Supp. 1297, 1300 (D. Cal. 1976) (the purpose of the Freedom of Information
Act); Liquilux Gas Servs. of Ponce, Inc. v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F Supp. 414, 418 (D.PR.
1969) (the purpose of the Puerto Rican Constitution).
7. President Carter adopted this view in the following signing statements: Statement
Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 96-592, 16 WEEKLY Comp. PRs. Doc. 2837 (Dec. 24,
1980); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 96464, 16 WEEKLY CoMP. Pans.
Doc. 2336 (Oct. 18, 1980); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 96-332, 16
WEEKLY Comp. Pans. Doc. 1592 (Aug. 29, 1980); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub.
L. No. 96-247, 16 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 965 (May 23, 1980); Statement Accompanying
Signing of Pub. L. No. 95-223, 13 WEEKLY Comp. Pars. Doc. 1940 (Dec. 28, 1977); see also
Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 94-88, I1 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 856
(Aug. 11, 1975) (interpreting Ford's legislative veto as a request for information).
8. See, e.g., Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-294, 22 WEEKLY Comp.
PRS. Doc. 612 (May 12, 1986) (Reagan); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No.
96-515, 16 WEEKLY Comn. Pans. Doc. 2802 (Dec. 12, 1980) (Carter); Statement Accompanying
Signing of Pub. L. No. 94-158, 11 WEEKLY Comp PRs. Doc. 1391 (Dec. 20, 1975) (Ford).
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Except for presidential statements addressing alleged constitutional infir-
mities, presidential statements regarding the specific meaning of statutes
have been rare. Before President Reagan, only a few presidents issued such
statements. In 1830, President Jackson sent a commumcation to Congress
that interpreted a statute9 concermng the location of road construction in
a manner that conflicted with congressional intent.'0 Twelve years later,
President Tyler stated he was sigmng a bill that he thought was both
unconstitutional and bad policy." Although this statement was not an
interpretation, it evoked strong congressional objection to presidential state-
ments accompanying the sigmng of legislation, in part because such state-
ments could contradict legislative intent.' 2 In modem times, President Truman
twice engaged in the "probably unprecedented course"' 3 of construing a
statute he signed in a partisan fashion. 4
Most of the pre-Reagan presidential'interpretations, however, have not
involved politically contentious issues. A search of the Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents uncovered ten other specific pre-Reagan inter-
pretations, all of which appeared be politically uncontroversial. Four (all
by President Carter) referred to presidential "understandings"' 5 and six
(three by President Carter) referred to legislative history with which the
President agreed.' 6 In addition, a Lexis and Westlaw search revealed two
9. "An Act Making Appropriations and Surveys, and also, for Certain Works of Internal
Improvement," 4 Stat. -427, ch. CCXXXII (1830) (President Jackson) (asking reference to a
presidential communication to Congress in relation to the bill).
10. H.R. REP No. 909, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1842).
11. Id. at 6-7
12. Id. at 7-8.
13. E. CORWiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFICE AND PowEas 323-24 (1984).
14. See Zinn, The Veto Power of the President, 12 F.R.D. 207, 231-32 (1952). Both
statements were partisan attempts to assure interpretations favorable to labor. Special Message
to the Congress Upon Signing the Portal-to-Portal Act, PuB. PAPERS oF PRESIDENT HARRY S.
TRuMAN 243 (1947); Special Message to the Congress Upon Approving the Hobbs Bill, PuB.
PAPERS OF PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN 336 (1946).
President Truman's comments on signing the Portal-to-Portal Act, dealing with the employer
"good faith" provision, were cited in Cole v. Farm Fresh Poultry, Inc., 824 F.2d 923, 928
(1lth Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1982); and Clifton
D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, 413 F.2d 658, 661-62 (4th Cir. 1969).
15. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 96-324, 16 WEEKLY CoM'. PREs.
Doc. 1521 (Aug. 8, 1980) (Carter) (the line between the lugh seas and inland waters does not
determine territorial jurisdiction under international law); Statement Accompanying Signing of
Pub. L. No. 96-205, 16 WEEKLY Com? Plns. Doc. 466 (Mar. 12, 1980) (Carter) (the United
States will continue to be reimbursed for costs from collecting duties and fees attributable to
importing petroleum products into the Virgin Islands); Statement Accompanying Signing of
Pub. L. No. 96-61, 15 WEEKLY Coz". PREs. Doc. 1435 (Aug. 15, 1979) (Carter) (the Act was
not intended to affect foreign fishing under other laws or agreements, or preclude the use of
foreign-built vessels by certain fisherman); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No.
95-473, 14 WEEKLY Con' PREs. Doc. 1794 (Oct. 18, 1978) (Carter) (the codifying Act does
not change law, resolve issues of agency authority or influence pending litigation).
16. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 96-450, 16 WEEKLY Comi. PRs.
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pre-Reagan cases citing presidential legislative history that contained specific
interpretations of uncertain political import.17 In sum, presidential interpre-
tations were infrequent and usually politically uncontroversial.
Judicial use of legislative history from legislative sources has become so
common, however, that it was probably inevitable that a president would
attempt to create his own legislative history. President Reagan inserted more
interpretations of statutes in sigmng statements than any of his predeces-
sors.'" Many of President Reagan's sigmng statements dealing with specific
Doc. 2231 (Oct. 14, 1980) (Carter) (the legislative lustory and bill language agree that the Act
codifies rather than changes law); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 96-324,
16 WEEKLY Comp. PaRs. Doc. 1521 (Aug. 8, 1980) (Carter) (the legislative report is clear that
the high seas/inland water line was drawn for safety purposes only); Statement Accompanying
Signing of Pub. L. No. 96-308, 16 WEEKLY Corn. Pans. Doc. 1334 (July 10, 1980) (Carter)
(the committee explains that the law eliunates uncertainty by reinstating prior Supreme Court
decision); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 94-158, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1391 (Dec. 20, 1975) (Ford) (the legislative history defines "national interest" for
purposes of indemnifying the loss of artwork); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L.
No. 93-645, 11 WEmKLY Corn. PRs. Doc. 20 (Jan. 4, 1975) (Ford) (the committee states that
Congress must take further steps before federal funds are committed); Statement Accompanying
Signing of Pub. L. No. 89-339, 1 WEEKLY Corn. PREs. Doc. 483 (Nov. 8, 1965) (Johnson)
(the legislative history is clear that assistance is provided only to humcane victims for whom
no insurance is available).
17. First, in Thomas Paper Stock Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 50, 54 (1946), the Court cited
a statement by President Roosevelt to support its view that the Price Administrator's authority
was limited. Second, in Pottharst v. Small Business Admin., 329 F. Supp. 1142, 1144-45 (D.
La. 1971), a presidential signing statement was cited but rejected, as was legislative history
from a bill sponsor and a committee report. The statute dealt with relief for borrowers under
the Small Business Act in connection with hurricane losses. See also United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 324-25 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Justice Frankfurter cited a presi-
dential signing statement to support the view that the statute was not a bill of attainder,
because there was no intent to punish individuals. The Senate's intent was unclear, and the
President's statement demonstrated that he had no such intent.).
There are also occasional references to a state governor's intent in deterrminig what a state
statute means, but usually for the purpose of confirming legislative intent. In State v. Brasel,
28 Wash. App. 303, 308, 623 P.2d 696, 699 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981), a mistake was made in
the language of a bill passed by the legislature, which defeated legislative intent. The court
cited the Governor's statement to support an interpretation that achieved what the legislature
intended, rather than what the statute said. In two other cases, the statute passed by the
legislature was transmitted to the Governor with different language from what the legislature
adopted. The Governor's statement was cited to support an interpretation supporting the bill
as passed by the legislature, not as signed by the Governor. State ex rel. Brassey v. Hanson,
81 Idaho 403, 415, 342 P.2d 706, 713 (1959); State ex rel. Board of Comm'rs of Laramie
County v. Wright, 62 Wyo. 112, 112-19, 163 P.2d 190, 190-92 (1945); see also State v. Strong
Oil Co., 105 Misc. 2d 803, 809-10, 433 N.Y.S.2d 345, 350 (the Governor's intent confirmed
what the legislative history asserted).
18. Journal commentary on President Reagan's action was generally negative. See Garber
& Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An
Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 363, 367 (1987); Note, Let Me
Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REv.
755, 775-76 (1987). But see Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presi-
dential "Signing Statements," 40 ADmN. L. REv. 209 (1988). Cross supports "the legitimacy
of some role for presidential signing statements in statutory interpretation" on three grounds.
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interpretations of statutes were politically uncontroversial. Four signing
statements announced understandings of statutory meaning,19 and three
asserted presidential agreement with interpretations by members of Con-
gress. 20 One signing statement articulated an understanding of a statute that
was "clearly supported" by cited material from a conference committee
report. 21
Unlike most of his predecessors, however, President Reagan attempted to
use signing statements to resolve politically sensitive issues and to undermine
the statutory structure. Use of these interpretations was carefully orches-
trated to enhance presidential influence on statutory interpretation. Attorney
General Meese, for example, persuaded the publishers of the United States
Id. at 234-38. First, Cross argues for an independent presidential role when the President
drafts or supports a provision. I argue against this position infra at notes 66-67 and accom-
panying text. Second, he argues that the President's interpretation is entitled to weight by
analogy to agency interpretations. I dispute this point infra at notes 56-65 and accompanying
text. Third, he supports a presidential interpretive power in a limited number of substantive
areas which involve a special claim of presidential power, such as foreign relations, a point
with which I agree. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L. No. 100-140, 23 WEEKLY Copn,.
PRs. Doc. 1238 (Oct. 28, 1987) (the President's "understanding" that a statute dealing with
pay for government physicians took into account prior service for the Veterans Admimstration
and Public Health Service but did not otherwise apply to VA and PHS doctors); Statement
Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-71, 23 WEEKLY CoMp. PREs. Doc. 800 (July ii,
1987) (expressing the presidential "understanding" that the law was not retroactive; the result
was that a prior regulation which authorized collection of money from shippers was not void
and the money did not have to be refunded); Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L.
No. 100-235, 24 WEEKLY COMP. Pans. Doc. 10 (Jan. 8, 1988) (signing a bill with the
"understanding that it will neither expand nor restrict" Freedom of Information Act disclosure);
Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-680, 24 WEEKLY CoMP. Pans. Doe.
1517 (Nov. 17, 1988) ("understanding" that ownership by inventors was determined m
accordance with the Bayh-Dole Act); see also Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L.
No. 100-688, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1548 (Nov. 18, 1988) (the President interprets a
statute consistently with treaty obligations; § 4202(b) of the statute and H.R. CoNi. REP. No.
1090, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1988) support the President's interpretation).
20. See Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-349, 22 WEEKLY CoMP. Pans.
Doc. 893 (July 2, 1986) (the President states "I am assured" that the statute's language
providing relief for borrowers should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to cases involving
very needy borrowers); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-396, 22 WEEKLY
CoMP PRns. Doc. 1125 (Aug. 27, 1986) (the President signs only after receiving "assurances"
from congressional committee leadership that a statute provided only a narrow exception from
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings appropriation reduction provisions); Statement Accompanying Sign-
mg of Pub. L. No. 100-2, 23 WEEKLY Cows. PREs. Doe. 87 (Jan. 28, 1987) ("I have been
informed" that overly broad statutory language was due to hasty drafting and "I am satisfied
from remarks on the floor of the Senate immediately prior to passage" that the statute does
not interfere with presidential discretion.).
In a final example, the President's claim that he was "assured" of the statute's meaning
probably undermined the statutory structure dealing with federal-state funding relationships.
See Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-339, 22 WEEKLY Comp PRs. Doc.
831 (June 19, 1986) (the federal government lacked power under the Safe Drinking Water Act
to impose significant conditions on states accepting federal money).
21. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-448, 24 WEEKLY Comi' PRES.
Doc. 1228 (Sept. 28, 1988).
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Code Congressional and Administrative News (USCCAN) to include presi-
dential signing statements in its widely read "Legislative History" section,
beginning on March 3, 1986. 22
In a little over two years, President Reagan signed four statements with
specific interpretations that were politically manipulative. These interpreta-
tions either adopted positions on issues that were unresolved in the political
debate accompanying the legislation's passage or attempted to undermine
the statutory structure. First, a 1985 sigmng statement accompanying the
Equal Access to Justice Act2 announced a presidential "understanding"
regarding the statutory standard for determnimng whether the government
must pay attorneys' fees to prevailing parties. President Reagan argued that
the statutory text, ,wich required that the government have "substantial
justification" for a litigating position, was more lenient than a "substantial
evidence" standard. The President was apparently reacting to a House
Committee Report, which reached a less pro-government interpretation. 24
Some legislators recorded legislative history disagreeing with the House
Report,21 and one decision suggested that the House Report may have been
a "rogue elephant" which did not embody a political consensus. 26 Although
courts have differed about the weight to be accorded this presidential
legislative history,27 it is clear that President Reagan attempted to resolve
an unresolved, contentious political debate.
Second, President Reagan suggested that the mandatory enforcement
language of the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 198621
22. Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L. No. 99-251, 22 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES.
Doc. 291 (Feb. 27, 1986), appearing in 1986 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN. NEWS 6-2 ("Legislative
History"). The new upgraded publication practice received significant press coverage. See
Tobip, .The Last Word, NEw Rruniuc, Nov. 3, 1986, at 13; Kmeic, Judges Should Pay
Attention to Statements by President, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 13; Strasser, Executive
Intent, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 10, 1986, at 2.
23. Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L. No. 99-80, 21 WEEKLY CoMP. Pans. Doc.
966 (Aug. 5, 1985).
24. Taylor v. Heckler, 835 F.2d 1037, 1044 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1987).
25. Miles v. Bowen, 632 F Supp. 282, 284-85 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (tracing 1980 and 1985
legislative history).
26. Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
27. Taylor, 835 F.2d at 1044 n.17, refused to decide what authority the statement had
because the court followed prior judicial precedent. Hadden v. Bowen, 657 F Supp. 679, 684
n.2 (D. Utah 1986), did not follow the President's interpretation. Miles, 632 F Supp. at 285,
cited the President's statement as partial authority for its conclusion.
On a related point, the Supreme Court refused to rely on the 1985 House Committee Report
in deciding a different aspect of the "substantial justification" standard. The question was
whether that standard required the government to have something more than a reasonable
basis for its litigating position. The House Report said that it did. The Supreme Court held
that it did not, rejecting the House Report. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-68 (1988).
Presumably, the 'Court's "reasonable basis" interpretation still leaves room for debate over
whether a position is "reasonable" if it is not supported by substantial evidence.
28. Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 102(b)(i)-(2), 100 Stat. 647 (amended 1986) (emphasis added)
("the Adumstrator shall issue an order . requiring the public water system to comply").
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unconstitutionally limited executive discretion. 29 The specific provision dealt
with federal enforcement of rules applicable to public water systems. The
President's interpretation, which permitted executive discretion, directly
contradicted a Senate Committee report30 and disregarded the fact that the
statute replaced the prior discretionary "may" language with a mandatory
"shall."'" This interpretation not only attempted to resolve an unresolved,
contentious political debate, but also undermined the statutory structure
mandating federal enforcement, as evidenced by the fact that "shall"
replaced "may" in the statutory text. This presidential foray into creating
legislative history evoked a critical response in the New Republic 2 and a
defense in the National Law Journal from a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General
33
A third, and even more politically controversial signing statement, accom-
pained the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.3 This statement
contained the President's "understanding" that the Act's anti-discnination
provisions (considered necessary because of new sanctions on hiring illegal
aliens) required a showing of discriminatory intent, not just disparate impact.
Representative Frank, the legislative sponsor of the anti-discrimination
amendment, charged the President with "intellectual dishonest[y] .113 The
legislative history is, in fact, murkier than either President Reagan or
Representative Frank suggested. 6 The legislative history, however, does
29. Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L. No. 99-339, 22 WEEKLY CoMp PRES.
Doc. 831 (June 23, 1986).
30. S. REP. No. 56, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, repnnted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhIN.
NEws 1566, 1574.
31. Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 102(b)(2), 100 Stat. 647 (1986) ("shall issue an order") (amending
42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(i)(B) ("may commence a civil action")); Pub. L. 99-339, § 102(b)(2),
I00 Stat. 647, amending 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(a)(2)(B). The claim of unconstitutionality tech-
nically places this sigmng statement outside the category of statutory interpretations umnflu-
enced by constitutional considerations. This was the statement that first attracted, national
press attention, however (see supra note 22), and it was viewed in the press as a straightforward
presidential effort to contradict legislative intent. The public perception was accurate because
the constitutional claim of presidential discretion was fanciful. It was rernumscent of the
President's claim of spending discretion to justify impoundment, which the Supreme Court
treats as a straightforward question of statutory interpretation. See Train v. City of New York,
420 U.S. 35 (1975).
32. Tobin, supra note 22, at 13.
33. Kmeic, supra note 22.
34. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-603, 22 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES.
Doc. 1534 (Nov. 6, 1986).
35. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1986, at 8, col. 1; see also 44 CONG. Q. WEiEKY REP 2990
(1986).
36. (1) Relevance of prior 1984 Frank amendment.
The 1986 House Report (H.R. REP No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADurN. NEws 5649, 5673), indicates that the anti-discrimination provision
was based on the Frank amendment, as reflected in the discussions and compromises on that
amendment in 1984 conference committee deliberations. Disagreement on another issue pre-
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indicate that Congress was unable to resolve the contentious debate regarding
what constitutes illegal discnmination and that the President tried to use a
sigmng statement to influence judicial interpretation. The signing statement
also announced a presidential "understanding" of a provision allowing an
alien some leeway to be absent from the country. 7 The President had
opposed this provision," and the sigmng statement may have been an effort
to mitigate the results of a political battle lost in Congress.39
vented passage of the bill with the Frank amendment. 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2623 (1984).
The 1984 version of the Frank amendment, passed by the House, stated that it would be
"an unfair immigration-related employment practice to discriminate against any individ-
ual," (H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 274A(h)(I)(A), 130 CONG. REC. H5640 (daily ed.
June 12, 1984)), without indicating whether the discnmination must be intentional. A later
provision in the Frank amendment, see id. § 274A(i)(l)(D), however, indicates that special
consequences follow from a finding that the discriminatory practice was intentional. The
implication is that the general definition of discrimination included more than discriminatory
intent. The Immigration Act which passed in 1986 did not, however, adopt the Frank
amendment in toto. It deleted the language providing for special consequences from a finding
of discnminatory intent, weakening the inference that discriminatory intent is not required.
See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 102(a) (amending
Immgration and Nationality Act, § 274B(g)(2)(B), I00 Stat. 3359, 3377-78 (1986)).
(2) Relation to Title VII.
The legislative history indicates that the Act extends Title VII protections to aliens. H.R.
REP. No. 682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 69; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
87, 88, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5840, 5842-43. Title V.II has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to apply to discnminatory impact. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This supports the inference that discriminatory impact is sufficient
to establish discrimination.
The President's response to this contention is that the Immigration Act only tracks §
703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(1964), which in his view requires proof of discriminatory intent. It is true that the Immigration
Act language is similar to § 703(a)(1) in applying to "discrimination against an individual,"
but it is not clear that § 703(a)(1) of Title VII is inapplicable to disparate impact. cases. The
courts have split on this issue, concerning the interpretation of both the statute and the
Supreme Court cases. Compare Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F Supp. 590, 594 (D.
Md. 1986) (disparate impact analysis does not apply) with Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co.,
705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984) (disparate impact analysis
does apply).
(3) Pattern or practice.
The President overstates his case against disparate impact by relying on the language of the
Immigration Act requiring "knowing and intentional discrimination" or "a pattern or practice
of discriminatory activity." It is not clear that "pattern or practice" means discriminatory
intent. The government believes that it does and cases brought by the governnent have adopted
this view. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-45 (1977).
Representative Frank, however, thought that "pattern or practice" meant something other
than intent. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at 14, col. 3.
37. See 22 WEEKLY Comp. Pans. Doc. 1534 (Nov. 6, 1986) (discussing the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, § 201(a)); id. at 1536, adding Immigration and Nationality
Act, § 245A(a)(3) (the statute requires "'continuous physical presence'" but permits "brief,
casual, and innocent casual absence").
38. The opposition to the provision for "brief, casual, and innocent" absence is recorded
in H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 124.
39. The same signing statement also states "understandings" about two other matters of
statutory detail whose political significance is unclear. See 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1534
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In a fourth signing statement, accompanying the Sentencing Act of 1987, 4
President Reagan expressed his "understanding" about the Act's meaning.
President Reagan's understanding comported with the Senate's view in a
contentious but unresolved political dispute with the House regarding whether
the Act covered crimes initiated before the Act's effective date and whether
courts possessed the discretion to depart from the Sentencing Commission's
guidelines. 41 In the signing statement, President Reagan opted for greater
retroactive impact and lesser judicial discretion.4 2
President Reagan also aggressively employed signing statements in at-
tempts to interpret away potentially unconstitutional provisions. He con-
strued four statutes in a fashion that avoided alleged constitutional problems
in affirmative action programs43 and interpreted another statute to avoid
interference with presidential power to control spending.Y Two mterpreta-
tions were based on a claimed constitutional power to protect the national
security. 45 In these interpretations, the President exceeded the traditional
areas of constitutional concern, such as the legislative veto, the appointments
power, foreign relations and execution of the laws."
(Nov. 6, 1986) (discussing the Immgration Reform and Control Act of 1986, § 302(a)), adding
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 210(d) (dealing with the procedures for adjustment of
status); id. § 101(a), adding Immigration and Nationality Act, § 274A(a)(5) (dealing with the
state's obligation to verify employment).
40. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-182, 23 WEEKLY CoMp. PMns.
Doc. 1452 (Dec. 7, 1987).
41. The House debates indicated that the Act did not cover cnmes begun before November
1, 1987, but the Senate disagreed. The Senate also differed from the House over the impact
of language added by the House to permit judicial departure from sentencing guidelines.
Compare 133 CONG. REc. S16646-48 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (Senate interpretations) with
133 CoNG. REC. H10015-18 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1987) (House interpretations).
The statement was cited in United States v. Charleus, 871 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1989), for
the uncontroversial proposition that the new Act covered cnmes committed on or after
November 1.
42. See Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L. No. 100-182, 23 WEEKLY CoMP. Pas.
Doc. 1452, 1453 (Dec. 7, 1987).
43. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-175, 23 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES.
Doc. 1388 (Nov. 13, 1987); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-661, 22
WEEKLY Comp. Pars. Doc. 1573 (Nov. 14, 1986); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub.
L. No. 99-578, 22 WEEKLY Comp. Pars. Doc. 1464 (Oct. 28, 1986); Statement Accompanying
Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-552, 22 WEEKLY Com. Pas. Doc. 1461 (Oct. 27, 1986)..
44. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-86, 23 WEEKLY CoMP. PaRs.
Doc. 918 (Aug. 10, 1987); see also supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (dealing with an
interpretation to avoid unconstitutional interference with presidential enforcement discretion
under the Safe Dnnking Water Act).
45. Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L. No. 100-440, 24 WEEKLY Com. Pans.
Doc. 1149 (Sept. 23, 1988) (the statute interferes with the President's power to implement
nondisclosure agreements with employees); Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No.
100-447, 24 WEEKLY Comi Pas. Doc. 1215 (Sept. 27, 1988) (protecting information about
military exercises).
46. The President's interpretations may also undermine the statutory structure when stating
whether an unconstitutional provision is severable. Compare Statement Accompanying Signing
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In short, President Reagan attempted to use signing statements to resolve
politically sensitive issues and to undermine statutory structure to a degree
not attempted by former presidents.
II. CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL USE OF PRESIDENTIAL
LEGISLATVE HISTORY
Judicial reliance on presidential legislative history encounters two prob-
lems. First, the President is not a legislator. The authority of traditional
legislative history depends on its origin within the legislative branch. Second,
many recent efforts to create presidential legislative history have been
politically manipulative. Politically manipulative legislative history possesses
no claim to judicial deference.
A. The President Is Not a Legislator
Legislators derive their authority to create legislative history from article
I of the Constitution of the United States. The President, however, is not
a legislator and therefore cannot create authoritative legislative history.
The Constitution explicitly gives the President three limited legislative
roles. First, the President has the power to approve or veto a bill.47 This is
the President's only legislative power granted by article I of the Constitution,
which otherwise vests "[a]ll legislative Powers ... in a Congress of the
United States .... "48 Second, article II vests the executive power in the
President, including the obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed . . . . 49 To the extent that execution requires interpretation, the
President arguably possesses an implied legislative power to interpret. Third,
article II grants the President the power to propose legislation.50 None of
these express or implied powers, however, justifies a presidential role in
creating authoritative legislative history.
1. The Power to Approve or Veto Bills
The President's article I power to approve or veto bills is a negative
power only and cannot therefore justify judicial reliance on presidential
legislative history.5' The Constitution generally does not require the President
of Pub. L. No. 100-637, 24 WFanLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1473 (Nov. 8, 1988) (not severable)
with Statement Accompanying Sigmng of Pub. L. No. 100-453, 24 WEay Comp. PREs. Doc.
1233 (Sept. 29, 1988) (severable). See also Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1089 (Ct.
CL. 1977), where the issue was the severability of an unconstitutional legislative veto, wich
traditionally depends on legislative intent. The court argued (with a straight face) that the
constitutional portion of the bill must be severable because otherwise the President would have
intentionally signed an unconstitutional bill.
47. U.S. Coxsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
48. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
49. U.S. CON T. art. II, § 3.
50. Id.
51. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 31 (D.C.
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to sign a bill for it to become law The only instance in which the President's
signature is required for legislation is when the signature is necessary to
avoid a pocket veto. 2
The President's signature on a bill is also irrelevant when applying the
rule that the last-passed law prevails over prior laws. Either congressional
intent or the date the legislature passes a law determines which law has
priority, not the date of the President's signature. 3
In rejecting arguments predicated on legislative history from legislative
sources, some courts have described the President's legislative role in affir-
mative terms.5 4 These courts have asserted that the President assents only
to the statute, not the legislative history More is required, however, to
justify judicial reliance on presidential legislative history. Simply put, an
argument used to reject legislative history from legislative sources cannot
justify judicial reliance on presidential legislative history without providing
some independent justification for an affirmative presidential role in creating
legislative history 5
Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); TilE FEDERALIST No. 73,
at 458 (A. Hamilton) (1888); 2 M. FARRANr, REcoRD OF THE FEDERAL CoVErNTIoN OF 1787,
at 132 (rev. ed. 1966); Zinn, supra note 14, at 241; see also Edwards v. United States, 286
U.S. 482, 490 (1932) ("The President acts legislatively under the Constitution but he is not a
constituent part of Congress.").
52. Although U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, states that the President shall sign a bill of
which he approves, failure to sign prevents legislation only if Congress has adjourned within
ten days of presenting the bill to the President (producing a pocket veto). See, e.g., Statement
Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 93-190, 9 WEEKLY Comn PaRs. Doc. 1470 (Dec. 17,
1973) (allowing a bill to become law without a signature). The President can avoid a pocket
veto by signing the law. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 490 (1932); see also La Abra
Silver Mimng Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 454 (1899) (the President "participates in
the enactment of laws" and can therefore sign a bill dunng a congressional recess).
53. See Pallottini v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 498, 503 (1988) (holding that congressional
intent prevailed). A concumng opinion gave pnority to the bill which passed Congress last.
No judge relied on the date of the presidential signature. Id. at 504.
The President apparently recognizes that congressional intent determines wich of two bills
takes priority. H.J. Res. 395 was passed by Congress on December 22, 1987, after H.R. 1777
had been adopted. H.J. Res. 395 explicitly modified a provision in the prior bill. Judging
from the Public Law numbers, the President signed the earlier-passed bill last, but he stated
his understanding of legislative intent that the second-passed bill prevailed. Statement Accom-
panying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-204, 23 WEEKLY CoMi. Pmns. Doc. 1547 (Dec. 22, 1987).
But cf. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-696, 24 WEEKLY CoMi. PREs.
Doc. 1548 (Nov. 18, 1988) (the last signed bill prevailed to cure an unconstitutional legislative
veto, when two bills were passed by Congress on the same date).
54. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951); FAIC Securities,
Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 361-62 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Notably, in Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1965), the Court was asked to rely on a vetoed
bill interpreting a pnor law as evidence of the prior law's meaning. The Court refused, in
part because the President who vetoed the bill had also signed the earlier law, implying that
the President's interpretation counts for something. Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 684 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (the Governor's veto message was
cited as evidence that a state law unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce
when the state legislature overrode the veto).
55. The absence of a presidential item veto is also significant in denying the President the
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2. Presidential Power to Execute the Laws
The President lacks an independent article II power to interpret the laws.
Article II gives the President only the power to execute the laws. Although
the execution of law sometimes includes the power to interpret law,56 the
President's power to execute the laws does not include an independent
interpretive power. Any contrary conclusion overstates the significance of
the President's executive power to "interpret" the.laws.17
An article II executive power to interpret the laws would circumvent both
the powers of the federal officials charged with administenng the laws and
the procedures by which these officials adopt rules. Admittedly, the Presi-
dent plays a role in influencing interpretations by federal officials. The
suggestion by some courts that presidential rulemaking depends exclusively
on an explicit congressional grant of power"8 takes too narrow a view of
presidential authority. Article II grants the President some rulemaking power
beyond what Congress has explicitly granted, including a role in statutory
interpretation.5 9 This role is best characterized, however, as a supervisory
power to create legislative history. One use of an interpretive power is to convert mandatory
into discretionary spending authority, which is the functional substitute for an item veto. Cf.
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir. 1988) (the President's erroneous
interpretation that a portion of a statute is unconstitutional does not prevent an award against
the government for attorneys' fees for "bad faith" because article I only permits veto of an
entire bill, not an item veto). For a recent argument that the President might possess an item
veto in some situations, see Sidak & Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe
and Kurland, 84 Nw. U.L. Rv. 437 (1990).
56. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (the power to execute is a power to
interpret the laws). Kmeic, supra note 22, argues that the President's power to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" (U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3) supports the President's interpretive
power. Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (the removal power inferred from
the power to execute the laws).
57. If an independent presidential interpretive power were inferred from the power to
execute the laws, it would extend only to statutes involving federal execution. This might be
construed expansively to include cases where federal execution would be affected indirectly by
a statutory provision, as when a private cause of action derived from a federal statute might
disrupt federal enforcement. In no event, however, would a federal statute implemented solely
by private or state enforcement involve execution of the laws by federal officials, absent federal
funding.
The President's power to remove federal officials, whatever that might be, is also an
inadequate basis for inferring a presidential interpretive power. The lesser interpretive power
cannot be inferred from the greater removal power, because the "greater" power cannot, as
a practical matter, be fully exploited. See Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex
Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 CoLum. L. REv. 943, 957 (1980) (the removal power
is a doomsday machine).
58. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304-08 (1979); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 168-72 (4th Cir. 1981); Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz,
526 F.2d 228, 234-36 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Martin, 557 F Supp. 681, 688-89 (N.D.
Iowa 1982); American Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 429 F Supp. 1179, 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 632-33 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(the power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is derived from legislation).
59. In Justice Jackson's termnnology, the rulemaking power is shared concurrently with
Congress, where the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables determine where
the line would-be drawn. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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power,6° which includes participating in the agency rulemaking process, 6'
coordinating policy and supplying a broader perspective. 62 This rulemaking
power does not authorize the President to use sigmng statements to circum-
vent Congress' grant of rulemaking authority to other federal officials or
the procedures for adopting rules that Congress has mandated in the
Admimstrative Procedure Act or that an agency has adopted as part of its
normal practice63 for interpreting statutesf64
There is, of course, something artificial in referring to the "President"
interpreting the statutes he signs. The precise mechamsm by which sigmng
60. Myers, 272 U.S. at 135 (supervise and guide); Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,
627 F Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986) (a certain degree of deference must be given to the
President to control and supervise executive policy); see also Verkuil, supra note 57, at 988
n.233 (precedent exists for delayed creation of rulemaking record); cf. Marks v. CIA, 590
F.2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (an executive order cannot supersede a statute but can raise
a question about statutory interpretation).
61. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ex parte communications
between the President and an agency permitted in informal rulemaking). This participatory
role is supported by the little-noticed presidential power to require "opinion[s], in writing, of
the principal Officer[s] in each of the executive Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
1.
62. Bruff, Presidential Control and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 575,
580 (1979); Shane, Presidential Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of Powers: The
Constitutionality of Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARiz. L. Rnv 1235, 1250-51 (1981) (the
purpose of presidential power is to foster accountability while operating interstitially).
63. If the legislation vests power in an agency, the President cannot authorize the agency
to bypass Administrative Procedure Act requirements applicable to the agency. Texaco, Inc.
v. Department of Energy, 604 F Supp. 1493, 1500-01 (D. Del. 1985); see also NRDC v. EPA,
683 F.2d 752, 755-58 (3d Cir. 1982) (compliance with an executive order does not violate the
Administrative Procedure Act in this case); cf. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 609-13
(1838) (the President's article II power does not allow lum to countermand specific legislative
instructions to an executive official). The President, however, is not subject to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Metzenbaum v. Edwards, 510 F Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1981) (the President
is not an agency).
The President would, of course, have an interpretive power in the unusual case where
Congress explicitly grants him that power. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)
(the President determines whether an imported article threatens national security); Econormc
Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904(a) (the President determines whether credit controls
are necessary to fight inflation). However, Congress usually grants administrative rulemaking
power to executive officials or an agency.
64. This criticism of presidential intrusion into agency rulemaking echoes the critique of
President Reagan's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to control the issuance
and content of adnmistrative regulations by agencies within the Executive Branch. See generally
Environmental Defense Fund, 627 F Supp. 566 (OMB cannot authorize delay beyond statutory
period); STAFF OF HousE Comm. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 2D Sass., REPORT
ON PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF AGENCY RULEmAxiNG (Comm. Print 1981); DeMuth & Ginsburg,
White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HAiv L. REv 1075 (1986); Kargman, OMB
Intervention and Agency Rulemaking, 95 YALE L.J. 1789 (1986); McGarity, Presidential Control
of Regulatory Dectsionmaking, 36 Am. U.L. Rav 443 (1987); Morrison, OMB Interference
with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HAIv L. REv 1099
(1986); Shane, supra note 62; Strauss & Sunstem, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADrv. L. REv. 181 (1986).
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statement interpretations are formulated has not been publicized. The officials
and agencies charged with adnunistering the law probably participate in this
process, presumably through the Office of Management and Budget. 65 Even
so, the problem of signing statements circumventing appropriate rulemaking
procedures remains. Because the sigmng statement is issued before the law
has gone into effect, both public participation and adnunistrative agencies'
expertise are necessarily excluded from the signing statement. In sum, the
President's article II power to execute the laws does not include a power
to interpret the laws.
3. The President as Proposer of Statutes
There is arguably a third constitutional basis for the President's interpre-
tive power. The Constitution authorizes the President to propose legisla-
tion." If the President, as a proposer of a statute, issues statements regarding
the meaning of a statute, these statements could create useful legislative
history on the theory that the originator of the statute is a reliable source
of its meaning.
This theory, however, cannot support a general interpretive power. A
proposer's views regarding a statute's meaning carry interpretive weight only
if these views are incorporated into the legislation. 67 Therefore, courts should
view executive proposals as legislative context that illuminate the legislature's
objectives and not accord executive proposals any independent interpretive
authority.
B. Political Manipulation of Legislative History
Even if the President possessed some independent legislative authority to
create legislative history, judicial reliance on a number of President Reagan's
65. The Department of Justice may also be involved when the issue has constitutional
overtones. See Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 98-183, 19 WiEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1626 (Nov. 30, 1983) (setting forth the views of the Department of Justice, not
the President, on the constitutionality of a statute).
66. At one time the President's effort to influence legislation was considered an affront to
the legislators. J. SUNDQUIST, TE DECLiNE AND RESURGENCE OF CoNGPass 28, 127 (1981).
This view has faded, along with the view that vetoes should not rest on policy disagreements
with the legislature. Id. at 136-54.
67. For example, in Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853-57 (1984), the Court
interpreted the language "in respect to" to include damage done to property m possession,
not just damage from possession. The drafter, who worked in the executive branch, had taken
that view, but the Court emphasized that this was relevant only on the assumption that the
interpretation was known to the legislature. See also Homer v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 815
F.2d 668, 674-75 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
A similar approach prevails at the state level. Institute of Living v. Town & City of Hartford,
50 A.2d 822 (Conn. 1946) (a legislative ad hoc committee report underwent change when its
views were acted on by the legislature); Twentieth Century Furniture, Inc. v. Labor & Indus.
Relations Appeal Bd., 482 P.2d 151, 153 (Haw. 1971) (the views of a nonlegislator who drafted
legislation are not legislative will).
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signing statements cannot be justified because these statements addressed
issues that should not be resolved in legislative history. A number of
President Reagan's signing statements either adopted positions m a conten-
tious, unresolved political debate or attempted to undermine the statutory
structure. Such political manipulation, even if attempted by legislators,
should not be permitted to circumvent the process by which statutory texts
are adopted.
On at least four occasions, President Reagan demonstrated a propensity
to employ signing statements in a politically manipulative manner. First,
with regard to the "substantial justification" standard for determining the
government's obligation to pay attorneys' fees to prevailing parties under
the Equal Access to Justice Act, President Reagan adopted the more
restrictive of two interpretations that had been disputed in the legislative
debates. 68 Second, President Reagan interpreted the Safe Drinking Water
Act of. 1986 to permit presidential discretion in obtaining compliance by
public water systems. Tis interpretation undermined the statutory structure
requiring federal enforcement, as evidenced by a Senate committee report
and the fact that discretionary language ("may") in the prior law had been
replaced by the mandatory "shall."169 Third, President Reagan interpreted
the anti-discrimination provisions of the Imnugration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 to require aliens to prove discriminatory intent, not just
disparate impact, despite the explicit dispute about this issue in the con-
gressional legislative history.70 Fourth, the President's interpretation of the
Sentencing Act of 1987 agreed with the Senate rather than the House
legislative history and opted for more limited judicial discretion to depart
from the Sentencing Commission's guidelines and for greater retroactive
impact. 7'
The President's interpretation may or may not have been correct in these
examples. 72 In each instance, however, the President attempted to use
legislative history to win an unresolved, contentious political battle or to
undermine the statutory structure. Even if the President does possess an
independent interpretive power, judicial reliance on such politically manip-
ulative signing statements cannot be justified.
C. Is There Anything Left for Presidential Legislative History?
This critique does not entirely eliminate the President's right to create
legislative history. In rare instances, the President possesses a limited right
68. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
72. See supra note 22 and text accompanying notes 32-33.
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to create legislative history. Although the President's article I veto power
does not create an independent legislative power, this veto power does force
legislators to seek compromises with the President. These compromises are
part of the legislative process and should, in rare instances, be accorded
weight as an interpretive aid when recorded in presidential signing state-
ments.
Some evidence in the rhetoric of certain signing statements suggests that
President Reagan recognized the difference between recording agreements
with legislators and other types of legislative history. Four sigmng statements
have included such phrases as "I am assured," "receive assurances" and
"I have been informed." 7 Such statements imply that the President had
reached an agreement with legislators. Other phrases in sigmng statements,
such as "I understand" or "understanding" suggest that the President is
engaging in an independent interpretation of the law.74
There are three problems with relying on legislative agreements recorded
in presidential legislative history. First, presidential agreement with selected
legislators might occur outside of the normal process of creating legislative
history from legislative sources. Legislators might therefore be unaware that
legislative history is being created and have no opportunity to influence its
content. Judicial reliance on presidential legislative history therefore should
be limited to instances in which it comports with legislative history recorded
in committee reports. and other typical sources of legislative history. How-
ever, if the legislative compromise is recorded elsewhere, the interpretive
value of the presidential legislative history is minimal.
A second problem is that determining whether the President agrees with
conventionally recorded legislative history is difficult. The terminology em-
ployed in signing statements is an unreliable indicator of the President's
views regarding more conventional legislative history I found only two
signing statements in which President Reagan used the word "understand ' 7
and one using the word "assured" 76 where recorded legislative history from
73. See supra note 20 (containing examples).
74. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
75. The understanding expressed in Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-
235, 24 WEEKLY CoMP. PaRs. Doc. 10 (Jan. 8, 1988)-that the statute did not either expand
or restrict Freedom of Information Act disclosure-agreed with both a House Committee
report and a statement in the Senate floor debate. See H.R. REP. No. 100-153(I), l0oth Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. i, at 31 (1987); 133 CONG. REc. S18635 (Dec. 21, 1987) (statement by Sen.
Leahy).
The President explicitly referred to a Joint Statement by Managers of the House Conference,
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 855, loath Cong., 2d Sess. 22, in Statement Accompanying Signing of
Pub. L. No. 100-448, 24 WEEKLY CoMP. PRys. Doc. 1228 (Sept. 28, 1988).
76. 132 CONG. REc. H5282 (Aug. 1, 1986) contains the legislative history with which the
President agreed in Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 99-396, 22 WEEKLY
ComP PREs. Doc. 1125 (Aug. 27, 1986) (signing only after receiving assurances from the
congressional committee leadership that the statute provided a narrow exception from the
Gramm-Rudman appropriation reduction provisions).
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legislative sources agreed with the President's interpretation. Moreover,
digging through the legislative history to determine whether such an agree-
ment exists is time consuming. Efficiency therefore suggests that reliance
on presidential legislative history should be limited to instances in wuch
the signing statements themselves refer specifically to the legislative history
with which the President agrees. I located only one signing statement"
containing reference to such additional legislative history Once its impor-
tance is understood, however, it should be relatively simple to record in the
signing statement the legislative history with which the President agrees. 78
A third problem with relying on legislative agreements in presidential
legislative history arises when the sigmng statement addresses unresolved
politically controversial issues or attempts to undermine the statutory struc-
ture. Such politically manipulative signing statements should be accorded
no interpretive weight. Once again, the language of signing statements
("assured" versus "understanding") is of little significance. Because the
presence of these terms in signing statements does not correlate with the
absence or presence of such issues, 79 it is difficult to identify such politically
manipulative signing statements.
As a result of these problems, very .few presidential signing statements
constitute reliable legislative history Developing a presidential practice of
citing legislative history from legislative sources, however, might increase
the number of reliable presidential signing statements.
The only other instance in which presidential legislative history could
arguably carry some interpretive weight involves legislation that threatens
to infringe on an area in which the President is specifically granted consti-
tutional power. In recognizing this interpretive power, however, the court
would only be according the President rulemaking power to defend himself
77. The President explicitly referred to a Joint Statement by Managers of the House
Conference, H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 855, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, in Statement Accompanying
Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-448, 24 WEEKLY Comp PaRs. Doc. 1228 (Sept. 28, 1988).
78. Even this approach poses problems because there may be other legislative history not
noted by the President which disagrees with the President's view. Cf. Statement Accompanying
Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-6, 23 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 148 (Feb. 12, 1987). This
statement was cited by the court in Humphrey v. Baker, 665 F Supp. 23, 25 (D.D.C. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court said that the President
agreed with the views of several members of Congress that salary raises were effective, id.,
but failed to mention that not all members agreed with that conclusion. See 45 CoNG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 219 (1987).
79. For example, words like "understand" appeared in interpretations involving unresolved
political disputes. See supra notes 23-27, 34-42 and accompanying text; see also Special Message
to the Congress Upon Sigmng the Portal-to-Portal Act, Pun. PAPERS OF PRESmr HARRY S.
TRumAN 243 (1947) (President Truman's signing statement dealing with politically sensitive
labor legislation stated: "I understand it to be the intent of Congress"). But they also appear
in some politically uncontroversial interpretations. See supra note 19.
Words like "assured" also do not correlate with the presence or absence of issues wich
can appropnately be resolved through legislative history. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text (three statements involved politically uncontroversial issues, but a fourth did not).
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from congressional infringement on his article II powers. For example, the
court arguably might recognize an independent presidential interpretive
power in signing statements attached to statutes pertaining to the appoint-
ments or foreign relations power.8 0 This interpretive power, if it does exist,
does not extend to all statutes because most statutes do not infringe on the
President's express constitutional powers.
CONCLUSION
Presidential legislative history must overcome a special burden before
courts should use it to interpret statutes. First, as a constitutional matter,
the President is not a legislator endowed with an independent power to
create legislative history. Second, some recent presidential signing statements
cannot satisfy standards for sound political decisionmaking because these
statements were obvious attempts to settle contentious political disputes or
to undermine the statutory structure. Presidential legislative history should
be an interpretive aid only when it records agreements with legislators and
cites traditional legislative history, such as committee reports. The only
other instance in which the President arguably possesses an interpretive
power involves signing statements attached to statutes that threaten to
infringe on the President's constitutional powers. In most instances, there-
fore, courts should not rely on presidential legislative history to interpret
statutes.
80. See infra Appendix, §§ II & III (listing examples); cf. Sidak & Smith, supra note 55,
at 457-60 (the most readily defensible item veto power is one which protects the President
from unconstitutional legislative impediments to the executive article II power).
A distinction should also be made between statutes and treaties. The President's power to
negotiate treaties might give him an interpretive power that he lacks in the context of legislation.
See Frolova v. Umon of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F Supp. 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1985)
(citation of presidential signing statement to support the view that the Helsinki accords were
not self-executing). The President, however, might not have the power to alter the interpretation
he gave the Senate to obtain its advice and consent. Compare Rainbow 3Navigation, Inc. v.
Department of Navy, 699 F. Supp. 339, 342-43 (D.D.C. 1988) (the government concedes that
the executive branch representations which form the basis of Senate treaty ratification are
binding on the executive branch; court agrees on the ground that this protects the Senate's
ratification power) with United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 374-77 (1989) (Scalia, J.,




OBJECTIONS, CONCERNS AND INTERPRETATIONS
OF STATUTES BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
CONTAINED IN PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS


























































































1. An astensk (*) after the Public Law Number means that the statement also appeared





































































The following three statutes provided that statutory waiting periods for
agency rules could be varied other than by statute. Like legislative vetoes,

















































































































































































IV. OTHER SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUES




































































































IV. OTmER SEPARATION OF POWERS IssUEs






















9* 23/1091 9/29/87 Reagan
C. Special Prosecutor (Independent Counsel)
Not in Executive Branch
9/1470 12/17/73 Nixon
1* 23/1526 12/15/87 Reagan
D. Commission in Two Branches of Government
20/1818 11/9/84 Reagan


























V. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES










B. Unequal Treatment of Veterans
13/1511 10/8/77 Carter
C. Nonuniform Bankruptcy Law
22/1567 11/14/86 Reagan
23/536 5/15/87 Reagan






























C. Power to Protect National Security
95-629
96-187
96-593
95-126
96-656
100-41*
99-372*
99-552*
99-557*
99-578*
99-661*
100-175*
[Vol. 66:699
